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estern European countries have their own »social model,« one that
that differentiates them from other industrialized countries. The ba-
sic foundation of the European social model, which was established dur-
ing the boom period after 1945, was shared. It included the pursuit of full
employment and Keynesian policies to stimulate demand. It also guaran-
teed social welfare and social rights that were more or less independent
of the relationship to the labor market. All Western European countries,
however, also adapted this framework by introducing their own policy
compromises, approaches, and institutions for social protection tailored
to their own needs and context. Consequently, the European social
model can be subdivided into five types, or regimes: British, Nordic,
Continental, Mediterranean, and Eastern. 
Since the middle of the 1970s, this model has been in crisis and much
reformed. Some people even suggest that a new social model for Europe
is needed. This paper seeks to isolate the major trends that are re-shaping
social policies. A comparison of the reforms implemented in a number of
European countries reveals common trends. In the decade from 1990 to
2000, social policies previously formulated in Keynesian terms had to ad-
just to a new economic framework characterized by the domination of
neo-classical, supply-side policies and conservative budget practices. Be-
ginning in the late 1970s, new economic conditions altered the operation
of social protection mechanisms and convinced many governments that
they should reconsider their social policies. Out of this process have come
two general trends that characterize all the policies implemented in Eu-
ropean countries: the desire to limit government social expenditures and
to redefine the role of the state (section 1), and the re-alignment of social
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programs with employment needs (section 2). It seems, then, that all re-
forms are trying to re-align social policies to supply-side macroeconomic
policies (section 3). However, one can also see the emergence of a new
social model, compatible with the new economic environment, and ca-
pable of promoting social justice and progress (section 4).
Limiting Growth in Spending and the Role of the State: 
The Era of Retrenchment
Whereas from the 1950s to the 1970s social protection policies extended
and increased social security coverage, the late 1980s and the 1990s were
characterized by retrenchment policies, that is, by reductions in social
spending levels. These changes marked a transformation in the economic
role of social protection, a change in the way the state’s role was formu-
lated, and the end of Keynesian compromises between the economic
sphere and the social sphere. The 1970s brought increased demand for so-
cial assistance, due in part to the economic downturn; the latter in turn
reduced tax revenues and payroll taxes. The deficits created by this drift
toward higher expenditures and lower revenues became a central prob-
lem for European governments, challenging among other things their
macroeconomic analysis.
Within the framework of Keynesian policy, temporary government
deficits provided a vehicle to boost consumption, which in turn facilitated
economic recovery. The recovery would culminate in an increase in tax re-
ceipts that were supposed to enable governments to rapidly make up the
deficits. In several European countries, however, Keynesian intervention
in the late 1970s did not generate these effects and ended in traumatizing
economic failure. For example, the two attempts at economic recovery
based on increases in social security benefits, tried in France in 1974/1975
and 1981/1982, did not have the expected results. To be sure, they boosted
consumption, but primarily consumption of imported goods and thus
did not generate a national economic upturn nor increase tax receipts. The
result was that government deficits and the trade balance deteriorated,
there was an exodus of capital, and exchange rates worsened. To tackle
these problems the French franc was devalued several times and taxes were
increased. However, both greater inflation and unemployment accompa-
nied these measures, generating »stagflation.« Eventually, France aban-
doned its Keynesianism in the early 1980s. The British Labour govern-
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ment faced its own difficulties with Keynesian strategies. Having carried
out a policy of recovery based on increases in social security benefits, it was
obliged in 1979 to borrow from the International Monetary Fund (imf)
in order to reimburse a level of public debt that had become intolerable.
Such anomalies raised doubts about the overall framework of govern-
ment intervention. From that point forward, new macroeconomic poli-
cies gradually became the norm in Europe. They emphasized budgetary
rigor, wage restraint, monetarism, and corporate competitiveness. There
was a growing demand for the role of the state to be downgraded, since
it was perceived as too costly and inefficient, and for a reallocation of so-
cial responsibilities towards other social forces, such as the market, the
family, or community associations.
The state’s role and economic objectives were modified. Full employ-
ment was no longer a direct objective of macroeconomic policy. It was
conceived instead as the future payoff of a virtuous chain of events trig-
gered by the new policies. This chain of events included: a slowdown in
price and wage increases; gains in competitiveness and productivity; a
rise in corporate profit margins and in value added not redistributed in
wages; and investment and job creation. An expression often used in the
1980s – »today’s profits will be tomorrow’s investments, which will create
the jobs for the day after tomorrow« – captures the idea that battling un-
employment had become of secondary importance in the state’s eco-
nomic policy objectives. Government spending, and in particular spend-
ing on social programs, was less important than private investments that
were supposed to create jobs. In this macroeconomic thinking, social
policies no longer played a central role in ensuring economic well-being.1
In this view, social expenditure had become a cost rather than a stimulator
of economic growth or a promoter of political and social stability.
Given this new attitude, cost reduction became a priority for most
European governments, beginning in Margaret Thatcher’s United King-
dom.2 Since then, comparative studies3 have demonstrated that, beyond
1. See especially oecd, The Welfare State in Crisis, Paris: oecd (1981); Hugh Heclo,
»Toward a New Welfare State,« in: Peter Flora and Arnold Heidenheimer (eds.),
The Development of Welfare States in Europe and in America, London and New Brun-
swick, nj: Transaction Books (1981), pp. 383–406.
2. Paul Pierson, Dismantling the Welfare State? Reagan, Thatcher and the Politics of Re-
trenchment, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1994).
3. Vic George and Peter Taylor-Gooby (eds.), European Welfare Policy – Squaring the
Welfare Circle, London: Macmillan (1996). See especially Chapter 1.
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the institutional differences and diverse social policies applied in various
European countries over the last fifteen years, all have tried to cut back
the Welfare State.
While the primary objective of these policies was to reduce social ex-
penditures,4 they also affected overall approaches to social protection in
two ways. First, to the extent that they frequently reduced public spend-
ing, they had an impact on the division of responsibilities among the
state, the family, the market, and civil society. In most cases, this involved
the partial privatization of social protection functions. Second, retrench-
ment indicated that social spending was no longer seen as an underpin-
ning of economic growth, but as a cost factor that needed to be reduced.
Retrenchment signaled the end of Keynesian compromise, thereby set-
ting the stage for finding a new economic role for social protection.
It would be a mistake, however, to assume that these changes have
ushered in an outright dismantling of European welfare regimes. Radical
neo-liberalism was not on the agenda, and institutional and political re-
sistance reflected the attachment of Europeans to their »social model.«
This opposition has brought a kind of reform that focuses on being
»employment friendly.« In this way, social policy is again seen to have a
constructive economic function.
The Emphasis on Employment in Social Protection Reform5
Whatever the social protection system, maintaining it has seemed to de-
pend on preserving or returning to high levels of employment. The result
is that the objective of social protection reforms gradually changed, fo-
cusing on both increasing the employment rate and decreasing the unem-
ployment rate.6 Three main sets of reforms – all giving priority to em-
ployment – are undertaken: (i) reforms in the way social protection was
4. This objective was met in part. Following a rise in the early 1990s that was linked to
the economic recession in Europe, social expenditures stabilized in most European
countries, although they often increased again in the early 2000s.
5. This section continues work carried out in collaboration with Christine Daniel, and
published as Christine Daniel and Bruno Palier (eds.), La protection sociale en Europe.
Le temps de réforme, Paris (2001) (La Documentation Française), Chapter 1.
6. This change in objective represented a major turning point for many countries, in-
cluding France, the Netherlands, and Germany, which had initially responded to
the rise in unemployment in the 1980s by removing certain categories of persons 
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funded; (ii) the introduction of stricter conditions for training (or other
occupation-related activities) in return for benefits, and (iii) increased
public services designed to increase the rate of female labor force partici-
pation.
The first set of reforms tackled funding based on the belief that the pre-
dominant method in continental Europe, payment of social contribu-
tions, penalizes employment. Consequently, several countries are mov-
ing to funding from general revenues or taxation, thereby broadening the
funding base. These methods were employed in France which in 1991 in-
troduced a new form of social protection funding, the General Social
Contribution (Contribution sociale généralisée, or csg). Germany too
focused on the burden of payroll taxes, while in 1998 it created a new type
of ecological tax levied on polluting activities with revenues earmarked
for social expenditures. 
The second set of reforms of European social policy involves the in-
troduction of stricter controls on training (or on other occupation-
related activities) requirements in return for benefits. These involve,
among other things, setting out new requirements for training or job
search for recipients of unemployment insurance or social assistance. Pol-
icies of this type are found in all social protection systems.
The Nordic countries sought to recapture the basic aim of a »working
society.« For these countries, this meant that everyone who was able to
work, should work. For example, in Denmark, so-called activation poli-
cies played an important role. These involved reforming the employment
policies introduced in 1994. The reform was in three parts, and involved
increasing eligible categories for leave and time-off (this, of course, was
of benefit only to the employed), restrictions on compensation, and
strengthening the requirement to participate in activation schemes. In
1997, Denmark also reformed its social assistance policy, placing even
greater emphasis than unemployment insurance did on the requirement
to participate in work-oriented activities organized by municipalities.
Activation policies also involved developing types of employment that
were less standard than those found in full-time work contracts. In the
Netherlands, this approach was implemented in several ways. First, part-
time work: although the country had a weak preschool system, this type
from the labor market in order to lower the unemployment rate, while providing
relatively generous replacement income to individuals who, as a result of this policy,
had lost their jobs.
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of work enabled women to gain entry to the labor market. Second, the
government placed certain restrictions on benefits paid to individuals of
working age, especially in the case of disability benefits, but also of un-
employment benefits. 
In the United Kingdom, the incentives were of a more restrictive or
conditional type, somewhat resembling Workfare. The slogan of British
Conservative governments had been to »make work pay« by creating or
increasing income tax credits, and by greatly reducing social security ben-
efits to levels that were well below the lowest wages. In addition, Con-
servative governments increasingly made benefits conditional upon train-
ing or job search activities; in 1996, unemployment compensation was re-
placed by the Job Seekers’ Allowance, which could be cut off if the
recipient refused several job offers. Since 1997, the Labour government
has not radically changed this overall approach in employment policy.
However, it did shift the emphasis somewhat, accepting the need to im-
prove training for job seekers, while continuing, within the framework
of the New Deal launched in late 1997, to subject training and job search
programs to effective monitoring. It has also created a lot of new public
jobs.
In continental Europe, the incentives were more timid. In most cases,
employment policies were paradoxical. Governments would continue to
apply labor-shedding measures (especially early retirement), even as they
provided claimants with incentives to return to work. The incentives in-
cluded reforming unemployment compensation systems (increasing the
compensation given to claimants who agreed to undertake training or
pursue other occupation-related activities: see the unemployment insur-
ance reforms in France in 2001, or the Hartz 4 reforms in Germany), in-
creasing training expenditure, and creating subsidized jobs.
The third set of reforms designed to encourage work is based on a very
different kind of approach. It does not aim to restrict access to monetary
benefits but rather to facilitate access to services designed to balance work
and family life (personal social services for children, the elderly, the dis-
abled, and so on). First, this strategy is seen to have an effect on employ-
ment rates, in two ways. Women are more readily available for work,
thanks to child care and services for taking care of vulnerable seniors. Sec-
ond, such services are themselves sources of jobs. In addition, this strat-
egy has been identified as one likely to foster higher birth rates. Women
wishing to work but without access to social services often give up the
idea of having children, as the situation in southern Europe seems to in-
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dicate. Third, such services combat child poverty. Women’s labor force
participation is one of the best defenses against child poverty, whether in-
volving lone-parent families or couples. Levels of poverty are lower in
families with employed parents.
This third set of reforms was adopted in different ways across Europe.
Social services, which were already highly developed in Nordic countries,
stayed at a high level, while labor market participation by women in-
creased. On the other hand, only a minority of southern European coun-
tries were fully committed to this approach. However, we will see that
this approach can serve as a basis for a renewed European social model,
in a new macroeconomic context.
The Shift toward Supply-side Policies 
The establishment of a single European market, which guarantees free
competition among all European firms, and the criteria set out by the
Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact (to ensure the sta-
bility of the euro), which present a coherent economic policy (reduced
public debt and deficit, controlled inflation, and fixed exchange rates),
were signs that, in the area of macroeconomic policy, Europe was collec-
tively adopting a new paradigm very different from its Keynesian prede-
cessor. The new paradigm involved supply-side policies (monetarist, neo-
classical) promoting free competition (deregulation, labor flexibility) and
was based on conservative budget practices (reduced debt and deficit, low
interest rates, reduced levels of inflation). Although this shift in Europe
had started in the late 1970s and had been implemented throughout the
1980s in various European countries’ economic policies, social policy
continued for a long time to operate according to the Keynesian logic of
the past. Social policy was thus in crisis because of its incongruity with
the new global economic logic. 
There are three reasons for the persistence of this discrepancy through-
out the 1980s and 1990s. First, institutional constraints and the influence
of the past made fundamental reform difficult. Second, many countries
used traditional social policies as a buffer to mitigate the social effects
(especially higher unemployment) of changes in economic policies asso-
ciated with tight budget and wage policies and industrial restructuring.
Third, while economic policy was increasingly defined at the European
level, particularly following the introduction of a single currency, social
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policies remained within the jurisdiction of national governments,
thereby making it more difficult to collectively define social policies that
were consistent with Europe’s dominant economic policies. 
Towards the end of the 1990s, faced with this growing incongruity be-
tween the trend in economic policy and the general orientation of social
policy, a global challenge characterized reform of social policy, namely the
need to adjust social policy to make it compatible with the new economic
standards.
Following studies carried out by numerous economists – backed up
first by reports published by the oecd and then the European Union –
new standards for social protection began to circulate in Europe. They re-
volved around adapting social protection systems to supply-side rather
than demand-side policies. The reforms were supposed to make social
protection systems more conducive to employment by reducing their
cost (especially the mandatory employment-related costs, which are a
burden on employment) rather than by increasing social spending. An-
other general principle of the reforms, consistent with the need to control
spending, was to direct government intervention towards individuals
who needed it most, instead of promoting universal social policies. Ulti-
mately, this would entail calling on everyone who played a role in social
protection – not only the state but also the private sector, families, and
community associations – to promote a system of social protection that
would be more efficient and closer to the individuals affected than that
delivered by governments alone. 
Social programs too were supposed to be more employment friendly
and to link benefits to incentives that made it preferable to work rather
than to receive social security benefits for doing nothing. We have already
noted that this trend toward the activation of social expenditures arose in
every European country. Employment policies and social policies were
increasingly based on wage restraint, limited increases in social expendi-
tures, growth in non-standard jobs (low-skilled, poorly paid, or part-time
jobs), and the restructuring of benefits to make them employment
friendly. 
By the end of the 1990s, there was increasing evidence that social policy
reforms were driven by a desire to restructure social spending patterns and
not simply to retrench or cut them back. Despite the diversity of the re-
forms and the processes leading to them, the reform objectives (more than
on their outcomes) exhibited several common trends. In the various Euro-
pean countries, they reflected an attempt to adapt welfare regimes to new
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macroeconomic norms, putting more emphasis on the market and
sounder public finances, less on public spending, and so on. 
For example, in the area of old-age pension reform, and despite using
different paths to get there, most European countries are now developing
a multi-pillar system, one that includes both pay-as-you-go and fully-
funded schemes, with an emphasis on the tight link between pension level
and amount of contribution paid. This is a particularly important change
for regimes that were based on social insurance and pay-as-you-go, as the
continental countries have been. For their part, in health care systems, the
introduction of managed competition seems to be spreading to all na-
tional health systems; it has also penetrated health insurance systems
through competition among insurers. Employment policies founded on
the concept of activation are also widely shared, as is the general principle
of activation, despite the fact that there are still big differences in the ways
these policies are implemented. 
As a consequence of such efforts to address challenges to strategies for
ensuring retirement and employment income, ways to increase the em-
ployment rate have become a generalized response. This trend implies
important changes in Bismarckian welfare regimes, which in the 1980s
adopted a strategy sometimes termed »a welfare state without work.« But
it is not only the continental welfare regimes that have been challenged,
the institutions of the European Union have been challenged to promote
their own responses as well.
This picture, albeit a very general one, is interesting because it presents
us with the emergence of new concerns and foundations for welfare
policies. Nowadays, all national European governments, as well as the
European Union, seem to recognize that welfare states should become
compatible with international competition. They should become
»employment friendly« by reducing their costs (especially non-wage
costs) and by offering benefits that do not function as disincentives to
employment. Hence the emphasis on activation and »making work pay.«
Targeting spending on those who »really« need (and deserve) it has also
become a norm. So too has the notion that welfare should not rely on
public intervention alone; other actors contribute – and ought to contrib-
ute – to the welfare mix. The family, ngos, and firms are receiving more
attention.
These measures brought about fundamental reforms in social protec-
tion, inasmuch as they involved not only modifying existing parameters
and instruments of social policy, but also changing the intent, overall
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logic, and orientation of established social protection. It was not only a
question of retrenchment, but also of creating a fundamentally new foun-
dation for social protection. Regardless of whether these policies were to-
tally new or simply reformed existing policies, they were based on a new
approach to social protection whose function was no longer to protect in-
dividuals against risk, but to change their behavior. This was frequently
referred to as changing social protection expenditures from a passive to an
active form. Less emphasis was placed on providing replacement income
than on providing incentives (in a more or less coercive fashion) for a re-
turn to the labor market. It was a question of moving from a guarantee
of replacement income outside the market (decommodification) to a
strategy of providing incentives designed to promote a return to employ-
ment and of bringing people back to the labor market (recommodifica-
tion). 
In Europe, many denounced this return to the market, since it often
embraced neo-liberal workfare policies. Other views, however, advanced
an alternative and more positive interpretation (from a social policy
standpoint) of these trends, since they signaled a transition from compen-
satory, passive, and corrective action to prevention, putting less emphasis
on the elderly (less expenditure on pensions) and more on investing in
the future. 
Toward a Social Investment State
When trying to re-orient social policies, to think of them more in terms
of investment than of compensation, investments should be designed to
help children and women (policies to combat child poverty, education
policies and orientation training, policies to reconcile family life and
working life). This alternative outlook has been summed up by slogans
such as »re-channel social expenditures toward social investments.«7 In
this new perspective, social policies should focus more on prevention and
social investment than on compensating for immediate difficulties. 
7. See, for example, Gøsta Esping-Andersen, in collaboration with Duncan Gallie,
Anton Hemerijck, and John Myles, Why We Need a New Welfare State, Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press (2002); and Jane Jenson and Denis Saint-Martin, »New
Routes to Social Cohesion? Citizenship and the Social Investment State,« in:
Canadian Journal of Sociology (winter 2003).
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While current systems of social protection are spending more and
more on seniors, new social policies should invest in children. Rather
than fighting social exclusion once it has occurred or trying to retrain
long-term unemployed older workers, for example, numerous experts
(such as Esping-Andersen) advocate prevention, centred on childhood.
Given the observation that the deepest poverty among adults is found
among those who grew up in poor and unemployed families, reducing
child poverty and providing good quality early childhood education and
care are ways of preventing social exclusion, as well as of ensuring a well-
trained, skilled, and flexible labor force. To achieve these goals, two
programs seem crucial, as demonstrated by Esping-Andersen and his
colleagues: (i) providing a basic income to all families by increasing
benefits in those countries where social assistance is still a residual benefit
and therefore leaves recipients in poverty; and (ii) developing public
programs of early childhood education and care that will guarantee a
solid socialization and promote school-readiness, so that people both in
school and after will be adaptable and flexible, characteristics needed by
a knowledge-based and service economy. 
Public services for all dependent and vulnerable persons, as well as
early childhood education and care, seem also to be the appropriate
means of addressing the issue of increasing women’s labor force partici-
pation and gender equality. Early childhood education and care and other
services create jobs for women and also allow mothers of young children
to work for pay and enable families to balance work and family life. In-
creasing women’s labor force participation obviously responds to
women’s desire for economic autonomy but it goes beyond that. It also
helps reduce child poverty, because poverty is always lower when two par-
ents are employed, and it increases the employment rate, such that reve-
nues are higher for states and for insurance-based social programs.
Policies »for women« have to do more than simply allow a work–family
balance; they must also provide gender equality and equality of opportu-
nity. This means, in other words, changing men’s trajectories as well as
women’s and altering the gender division of labor within the household. 
This is, in other words, a program for changing both work and family
life. Such analyses by experts as well as that of the Commission itself have
fed the efforts of the European Union to forge a virtuous circle of inter-
action among macroeconomic, employment, and social policies. Indeed,
a new principle emerged in the framework proposed in the various texts
on social policy adopted by the European Union, »quality.« 
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As Jane Jenson has shown,8 putting the accent on quality builds on the
premise that »social policy is a productive factor« rather than a drain on
the economy. Good social policy is a necessary feature of a well-function-
ing modern economy, particularly one that hopes to position itself well
in a high-stakes knowledge economy. In part, this is because it helps, as
the Stockholm European Council Conclusions put it, to ensure security
in times of change. Such security enables people to take risks and invest
in their human capital as well as that of their children, and so on.
For the European Union, promoting quality in employment and so-
cial policy is a key element in reaching the goals of building more and bet-
ter jobs, creating a competitive and cohesive knowledge-based economy,
and ensuring a positive mutual interaction between economic, employ-
ment, and social policies. As such, quality goes hand in hand with im-
proving efficiency, especially as far as public finances and labor market in-
centives are concerned. Social policies are not simply an outcome of good
economic performance and policies but are at the same time an input and
a framework. In this context, the modernization of the social model
means developing and adapting it to take account of the rapidly changing
new economy and society, and ensuring the positive mutually supportive
role of economic and social policies. We can expect many aspects of the
modernization of the social model to have a positive impact on the qual-
ity of work – including both social investments and social transfers.
Hence the pursuit of more and better employment and higher levels of
economic performance cannot be separated from the overall aims of
modernization of the European Social Model. 
8. The European Social Model. Seeking a Roadmap for Gender and Generational
Equality, paper prepared for the Policy Network/London School of Economics in
the context of the uk Presidency of the European Union (June–December 2005).
